OAuth 2.0 Tutorial 3: The Implicit Grant Type
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Oauth authorization code flow vs implicit
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In fact you are not forced to do so if you implement your own authorization server but you must know that you are opening a big security hole by doing this. Les diagrammes de séquences sont bien utiles aussi. Any members used that are not understood MUST be ignored.
This error MAY be returned when the prompt parameter value in the Pan Request is none, but the Authentication Request cannot be completed without displaying a user interface for End-User interaction. Each use case is described in detail below. By requesting access to user data in context, viayou help users to more easily understand why your prime needs the access it is requesting. As discussed in the section, these values can be obtained in the API Console. The amr value is an array of case sensitive strings. It enables Clients to verify the identity of the End-User based on the authentication performed by an Prime Server, as well as to obtain basic profile information about the End-User in an interoperable and REST-like manner. OIDC — Hybrid Flow The mechanics of this authentication flow are explored. All of these parameters will be validated by the authorization server. However, the higher risk la is largely due to the fact that it is meant to enable applications that execute active code, served by a remote resource to a browser. When registering a new app, you usually oauth authorization code flow vs implicit basic information such as application name, website, a logo, etc. Application access In some elements, applications may need an access token to act on behalf of themselves rather than a user. The OP advertises its public keys via its Discovery document, or may supply this information by other means.
Other members MAY be defined to provide additional information about the requested Claims. The technology described in this specification was made available from contributions from various sources, including members of the OpenID Foundation and others. If the user has authorized the app, the request is executed right away. Self-Issued OPs do not issue Access Tokens.
OAuth 2.0 Tutorial 3: The Implicit Grant Type - This can occur for a client that uses the implicit flow where the token is passed directly as a parameter in the URL hash and don't properly use the OAuth state parameter. As it turns out, though, there are a handful of things that can be used along with OAuth to create an authentication and identity protocol on top of this delegation and authorization protocol.
Both flows have the exact same result: an access token. It's more work both for the provider and the client. Details below: The implicit flow is only possible in a browser environment because of security reasons: In the implicit flow the access token is passed directly as a hash fragment not as a URL parameter. One important thing about hash fragment is that, once you follow a link containing a hash fragment, only the browser is aware of the hash fragment. This makes it possible to pass an Access Token directly to the client without the risk of it being intercepted by an intermediary server. This has the caveat of only being possible client side and needs javascript running client side to use the access token. Passing the access token directly in a URL param could in theory be possible but the auth sever would have to make sure the redirect URI is using HTTPS with TLS encryption and a 'trusted' SSL certificate typically from a Certificate Authority that is not free to be sure that the destination server is legitimate and that the HTTP request is fully encrypted. Having all developers purchase an SSL certificate and properly configure SSL on their domain would be a huge pain and would slow adoption down tremendously. You could also argue that the implicit flow is less secure, there are potential attack vectors like spoofing the domain upon redirect - for example by hijacking the IP address of the client's website. This is one of the reasons why the implicit flow only grants access tokens which are supposed to have a limited time use and never refresh tokens which are unlimited in time. To remedy this issue, I advise you to host your webpages on an HTTPS-enabled server whenever possible. The hash token never goes over the wire, except from the SSL Resource Server. So in theory the Resource Server could restrict to redirect url to HTTPS only domains and it would be save although this is not part of the OAuth2 draft. It's only requests that are initiated from somewhere else to the client that may be done over HTTP because the client server might not support HTTPS. For instance the redirect that happens during the auth flow after the user grants authorization on the gant page is a redirect initiated from the browser to the client server and may be done in HTTP. As the client application, which is typically JavaScript running within a Browser is less trusted, no refresh tokens for long-lived access are returned. Returning an access token to JavaScript clients also means that your browser-based application needs to take special care — think of XSS Attacks that could leak the access token to other systems. I would expect that when one has an XSS vulnerability, then even the authorization code flow does not help much. But I agree that since the way how the access token is passed to javascript in the Implicit flow is standardized as a hash fragment , and if there is XSS vulnerability in the website, then constructing an attack which reads the access token from URL hash fragment is quite easy. With authorization code flow, on the other hand, cross-site request forgery might be possible. These clients are typically implemented in a browser using a scripting language such as JavaScript. As a redirection-based flow, the client must be capable of interacting with the resource owner's user-agent typically a web browser and capable of receiving incoming requests via redirection from the authorization server. Unlike the authorization code grant type in which the client makes separate requests for authorization and access token, the client receives the access token as the result of the authorization request. The implicit grant type does not include client authentication, and relies on the presence of the resource owner and the registration of the redirection URI. Because the access token is encoded into the redirection URI, it may be exposed to the resource owner and other applications residing on the same device. But what auth server checks redirect url and this is actually enough for security. But the browser make an additional redirect with replacing history to remove hash fragment from the url. It also possible to a hacker to stole the access token by sniffing a HTTP trafic but this can be easily protected by HTTPS. Some malicious browser extensions can have an access to urls from address bar but this is ultimately bad situation like broken HTTPS cert. So what I can see is that passing access token via hash fragment of url is absolutely safe.